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The theme of mutuality has lately emerged in anthropology by the hand of 
two of our most influential contemporary thinkers.  Yet they explore it in 
apparently unrelated guises: by the hand of Johannes Fabian, mutuality 
emerges as a methodological preoccupation in discussions about fieldwork 
ethics referring to the way in which anthropologist and informant are 
engaged in processes of co-responsibility (2001, 2007); by the hand of 
Marshall Sahlins, mutuality is a constitutive principle in personal ontogeny 
that allows for a theoretical re-founding of kinship studies (2011).  Are the 
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two meanings simply unconnected or do they share something in common 
which may turn out to be of theoretical relevance for contemporary 
anthropology?  In this essay, I aim to show that both meanings are indeed 
relevantly interrelated but, in order to do so, I find it necessary to explore 
further Marilyn Strathern’s proposals concerning the intrinsic plurality of 
persons.  Mutuality would be the movement between singularity produced 
out of plurality and plurality produced out of singularity – and that is why it 




Fabian’s ethnographic mutuality 
In his well-known essay “Ethnographic Misunderstanding and the Perils of 
Context,” Johannes Fabian defines ethnographic mutuality as “the promise 
of nontrivial understanding that is produced by researcher and researched 
together.” (1995: 47) In short, an unavoidable aspect of all fieldwork 
interaction would be the occurrence of a feeling of shared revelation.  In our 
present world of almost instantaneous globalization, even more so than in 
the past, the ethnographer’s presence in the field, as well as what she 
eventually comes to write about it, has an impact on the field but, more than 
that, it corresponds to processes of joint discovery.   
In that sense, the typical preoccupation of the young ethnographer at 
being lied at by the informants soon gives way, in the more seasoned 
ethnographer, to what one might call a Rashomon fascination: the 
awareness that there is no end to interpretation and that we will ever be 
working on processes where absolutes play no role.  Ambiguity will ever 
persist, as the ethnographic moment is part of the broader process of 
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human communication and, thus, it is subject to what Donald Davidson 
calls the indeterminacy of interpretation (2001).   
More than that, however, the traditional propensity of anthropology 
towards semiotic models of interaction, where conscious meaning is treated 
as the be-and-all of communication, must give way in the years to follow to 
more sophisticated understandings of the fieldwork context.  We have to 
find ways of approaching analytically the ethnographic gesture that do not 
disembody it; that preserve its physicality in a world where what we 
understand is as much communicated by others as it is understood with 
others.  We participate jointly in environments that are historically inscribed 
with sociality.  As Evans-Pritchard used to put it, the ethnographer should 
attempt to learn to use, at least rudimentarily, the tools that centrally mark a 
native’s life, failing which he will never understand the meaning of their 
world (1976). 
 Let us take as an example a classical essay that most anthropologists 
have read: Victor Turner’s article on Muchona, his favoured informant, that 
he wrote for Joseph Casagrande’s time-setting volume In the company of man  
(1964, re-edited in A Forest of Symbols, 1967).  There Turner describes how 
he was walking along a dusty road in what is now north-western Zambia in 
the company of his research assistant when he noticed a parasitical growth 
on a tree that he had been told had special curative powers.  He tried to 
identify it, but clearly he was not getting it right.  Suddenly, from behind 
them, another traveller of whom they had not been aware entered their 
conversation: Muchona, a strange little man who turned out to be a true 
erudite about such matters.  Over the following months, Turner and 
Windson, his Christian assistant, underwent a process of shared revelation 
with Muchona that eventually gave rise to some of the most famous books 
in mid-century anthropology (1962, 1967, 1968, 1969). 
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 Turner’s way of approaching the topic is quite explicit: (a) the 
presence of the tree and the nature of the road where they first met and the 
inhabited spaces where, later on, they had their heated evening 
conversations was of the essence for the interaction; (b) language was 
constantly failing them – Turner’s Ndembu was not very good, his assistant 
found it difficult to represent what was being told by Muchona in terms of 
his own urban Christian vocabulary, and, to top it all, Muchona’s speech was 
a world of ambiguities and innuendos not always helped by a tendency to 
drink too much (1967: 139); finally, (c) everyone present had their reasons 
for being interested in the interaction – these reasons diverged but they also 
came together in a mutual fascination with the cosmological implications of 
traditional methods of cure. 
 As the linguistic philosopher H. Paul Grice has taught us quite a 
while ago, the intentions of a speaker frequently differ from the standard 
meaning of the words (e.g. Medina 2005: 30).  This may be due both to 
irony and metaphor as, further still, because the meaning is dependent upon 
a series of presuppositions about the world that would not be present in the 
meaning of each of those words and each of those sentences if we were to 
enquire about them in a disembodied fashion (as one might say, their 
dictionary meaning). In short, the communicative intentions of the speaker 
are an integral part of the interpretative process and the listener constantly 
hypothesises concerning what she hears.  Thus, often enough, other’s 
speech is punctuated by grants, gestures, comments and questions that aim 
at specifying, directing, intervening in what one is hearing. 
 What this means is that, behind each communicative act, there is the 
presumption of a kind of cooperation.  The communicative act is reflexive 
from the word go; it depends on a disposition on the part of the both 
speakers that Donald Davidson calls “interpretive charity” (2001) – the 
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implicit acceptance that the gestures of the person who is in front of me can 
be endowed with meaning. 
 Primatologists, however, go a step further when they claim that 
human communication differs from that of other primates in that it is 
fundamentally grounded on a proclivity towards perceptually co-present joint 
attention.  For Michael Tomasello, this notion can be encapsulated in the 
sentence, “I want you to know that I want you to attend to something, but 
that I want us to know this together.” (2008: 91)  What this implies is that the 
simplest occurrence of ostension already involves active co-presence.  My 
communicative intention is communicated at the same time and jointly with 
the actual communication.  If then we do not limit our attention in studying 
human social life to verbal expression but take in the whole of the context 
of communication, we realize that mutuality is constitutive and not the 
product of the intentional act of communication. 
Ethnography is an activity that is centrally dependent on 
intersubjectivity (cf. Duranti 2007), which means that perceptually co-
present joint attention is also part of it.  Thus, the ethnographic gesture 
involves a form of cooperation that is constitutive of the partners because it 
presumes joint attention.  The ethnographer imparts information as much as 
she gathers it.  This is the case even when she is so struck by the contrast in 
worldviews or so keen on emphasising it that she fails to see that mutuality 
is a condition of possibility of her ethnography.  We often presume that the 
worlds that come into confrontation during the ethnographic encounter are 
radically separate and will remain so thereafter.  This, however, is neither 
true about the ethnographer nor about her informants (particularly those 
who, like Muchona and all those that are written about in Casagrande’s 
book, develop close links with the ethnographer, often over long and 
formative periods).    
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Moreover, we tend to think of ethnography in the past as a gesture 
that left no traces behind, as if the beaches of the Trobriand Islands, the 
sand tracks of Sudan, or the dirt roads in the Cooper Belt were places 
frozen in time; as if the ethnographer’s presence were not part of the 
historical process of modernity.  Gluckman and his students, for one, knew 
only too well (as part of the their political engagement) that there was no 
going back in history.  One of the reasons for that is that human 
communication is mutually constitutive.   
Ethnography is constitutive both at the moment of the encounter 
and in the echoes that it produces in time.  Who would fail to see the 
relevance that Junod’s presence in southern Mozambique and the Transvaal 
from the 1890’s to the 1920’s came to have to the history of southern 
Africa?  Who would fail to understand the link between Eduardo 
Mondlane’s youth in Junod’s mission and the path that would lead him to 
becoming the father of a new nation?  In turn, Patrick Harries, studying the 
background that led to Junod’s ethnography insists that Switzerland’s own 
confrontation with the “primitiveness” of its rural citizens through folklore 
studies was the fertilizer that produced Swiss missionary ethnography in 
Africa (2007). 
As such, when we come to discuss the ethnographic gesture, we must 
overcome the traditional binarist view.  We cannot exhaust our analysis of 
ethnographic mutuality if we persist in closing it into a relationship of 
bilateral reciprocity (I give, you give).  The ethnographer entices and, in 
turn, is provoked.  As Tomasello insists, “in mutualistic collaborative 
activities the difference between requesting help and offering help by 
informing is minimal.” (2008: 196) The ethnographer and the informant are 
not only exchanging information, they are jointly attentive to the world.  
Being jointly attentive, however, is a gesture that goes beyond 
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communication, as it is formative of the worldview of those involved.  The 
desire to help mutual understanding is part and parcel of the ethnographic 
process. The ethnographer affects his informants in their future life choices 
quite as much as their concerns and fascinations affect his work, his 
personality and the worldviews of his future students.  Fabian alerts us to 
the fact that this is not something that ends the moment the ethnographer 
leaves the field: “Others are not consumed, as it were, by either ethnology 
or history; they remain present and confront us.” (2001: 77)  Muchona’s 
concern with the oncoming of modernity and his attempt to negotiate it are 
part of Turner’s story. 
 But, of course, as I start to write my notes – immediately in the field 
– I start opening myself to other communicative intentions, those that mark 
academic writing.  And those, of course, may enter into contradiction with 
the local context.  Yet, there is nothing surprising about that, since that is an 
intrinsic aspect of the human condition.  As Joan Bestard and I have argued 
a long time ago, all interests are perforce limited, both because of the 
complexity of our engagement with the world and because of the crossing 
of different perspectives in our own persons (Pina-Cabral 2003: 47-54; 
2010a).  Our simultaneous engagement with different persons and different 
groups implies a mutualistic plurality of interests. 
 In order to understand the people I study, I must necessarily enter 
into a mutualistic game of interpretation of their intentions and of our joint 
contexts, I cannot by any means depend exclusively on language.  This is the 
occasion, therefore, to criticise a certain logocentrism that has become a 
methodological commonplace in anthropology.2  More than just a political 
                                         
2 Indeed, as A. Duranti has suggested, “Even in the case of highly codified semiotic systems such as 
historical-natural languages, we should not assume that the ‘directionality’ or ‘aboutness’ of talk is always 
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or ethical implication of our present globalized condition, ethnographic 
mutuality is a condition of possibility of the ethnographic gesture. 
 
Sahlins’s kinship as mutuality of being 
It is here that Sahlins’ recent disquisitions concerning “mutuality of being” 
become relevant (2011).  The force of his argument lies in the observation, 
that some of us have been exploring already for some time3 that persons are 
mutually implied and plurally constituted.  He quotes appositely a passage of 
one of Monica Wilson’s classical works where she reports that, for the 
Nyakyusa of Lake Nyassa, “kinsmen are members of one another.” 
(2011:11)   
His central idea is that we can overcome the culturalist excesses of 
Schneider and his followers – thus refounding the comparative study of 
kinship on new bases – if we go beyond the mind/body polarity that was 
implied in the earlier modes of relating “social” kinship with “biological” 
kinship.  We must acknowledge that persons are interdependent; they are 
partible in the sense of being “members of one another.”   
Sahlins, thus, sustains that “the capacities of partibility and hierarchy 
(the encompassment of others) are general conditions of humans in 
language.” (2011. 13)4  He argues that this notion of partibility is better used 
to generalize the condition of humans in general, whilst “dividuality” should 
                                         
identifiable in terms of a linguistically encoded concept or a linguistic category of action, such as a speech 
act.” (2006: 36) 
3 E.g., Toren 1999, Pina-Cabral 2009, 2010b and 2010c.  
4 But, here, we should be weary of the logocentric pitfalls of overstressing spoken language, for we must 
include in this category all forms of communication (and, most essentially, gestural communication, from 
which spoken language derives).  I owe this insight to Tomasello (2008) but Donald Davidson had long 
ago warned us about the dangers of this sort of logocentric deviation (2001). 
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be applied to kinship phenomena in particular.  According to him, the latter 
“is a differentiated sub-class consisting of partibility plus co-presence.” 
(2011: 13-14)  
Thus, “for understanding kinship much is gained by privileging 
intersubjective being over the singular person as the composite site of 
multiple others.” (2011: 14)  Kinsmen share a common substance.  Whether 
this is communicated by means of metaphors of blood, commensality, co-
residence, or others is a matter of ethnographic detail.  He correctly insists 
that there is no question of seeing these as “cultural” as opposed to 
“natural” features, since “human birth is not a pre-discursive fact.” (2011: 3)  
Kinship, therefore, (and particularly, I would add, the constitution of 
collectivities) entails “the incorporation of others in the one person, making 
her or him a composite being in a participatory sense.” (2011: 13)  Finally, 
joining a tradition implicit in a long line of anthropological thinkers, he 
comes to define a kinship system as “a manifold of intersubjective 
participations, founded on mutualities of being.” (2011: 10) 
We must ask, therefore, whether this mutuality of being, as in kinship, 
is of the same nature as Fabian’s ethnographic mutuality.  As I read Sahlins’ 
argument, he is proposing that both types of mutuality are implicit in 
personal partibility, namely that our disposition to attend to others by 
processes of shared intentionality leads to our personal co-construction in 
contexts of sociality.  By qualifying kinship mutuality as a mutuality of being, 
however, Sahlins seems to be proposing that kinship is a sub-category of 
that general feature that is characterised by co-presence.  If this is the case, 
whilst his proposal of a universalisation of the notion of mutuality seems 
highly relevant, one must wonder (a) whether his reading of the concepts of 
dividuality and partibility is correct and (b) whether he is not, in fact, striving 
to save sociocentric theorizing.  As it happens, he claims he is doing just 
that (2011: 13), and it is not up to us to take him as joking or as failing to 
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understand the meaning of the terms. In any case, if we are to use a concept 
such as that of mutuality to our own satisfaction in our ethnographic 
analyses, we are bound to try to make sense of our own ideas on such a 
deeply relevant topic.  We should, therefore, focus upon the locus classicus of 
the attack on sociocentrism since, at the same time, it is also the most 
profound analysis of the notion of the person in terms of dividuality.  This 
is Marilyn Strathern’s initial passage concerning the opposition between 
society and individual in The Gender of the Gift (1988: 11-15 and 348-9 n7). 
 
Dividuality and Partibility5 
It is interesting that Strathern should start this passage by declaring frankly 
“I have made an easy living through setting up negativities, showing that this 
or that set of concepts does not apply to the ethnographic material I know 
best…” (1988: 11).  She feels she needs to go beyond the deconstruction of 
classical anthropological concepts that she quite correctly identifies with 
Leach and Needham (1988: 348 n6).   
She famously proposes: “We must stop thinking that at the heart of 
these cultures is an antinomy between ‘society’ and ‘the individual’.” (1988: 
12)  The way she achieves this is by pitting Melanesian “ideas about the 
nature of social life,” with which she has come to be familiar through 
fieldwork, with “ideas presented as Western orthodoxy.” (ibid.)   What 
follows is one of the most profound explorations of the nature of 
personhood that has ever come out of the hand of any anthropologist since 
Lévy-Bruhl’s late personal notes (1949).   
                                         
5 I am grateful to Christina Toren for her help in reading these passages.  What I make of them, of course, 
should not be held as representative of her views.  
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Time, however, has taught us that the polarization between 
Melanesian society and Euro-Americaness/Westerness on which she relies 
(what she calls “setting up negativities”) to help her undertake the critique 
of anthropological thinking on personhood, turns out to be more complex 
than it seemed at first.  This, in fact, was one of the recurrent discomforts 
that Lévy-Bruhl too addressed in his prophetic late notes and we should 
have given greater attention to his critical struggles instead of simply 
criticising him for his earlier views (e.g. 1949: 48, 130, 165 or 184).  The 
features that Strathern identifies as Melanesian are, in fact, far more 
universal.  
As it happens, a number of us have recently been discovering (and 
Sahlins too, of course) that her attack on sociocentrism has deeply universal 
relevance.6   The existence of “ideas presented as Western orthodoxy” (ibid.) 
is a fact, but it does not mean that these are the correct ideas to describe 
those whom we (erroneously) call “Western.”  Why erroneously? Because by 
calling them so, we are already imposing upon them the orthodoxy that we 
should be wishing to deconstruct?  It is, and excuse the poor taste of the 
metaphor, like saying that the best way to write about Germans in the 
1930’s is by describing them in racialist terms.  More than anything else, the 
relatively recent field of “new reproduction technologies” has brought this 
aspect to our attention both in matters concerning kinship and concerning 
the relation between science and society.7 
                                         
6 E.g. a recent number of the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16 (2), 2010. 
7 In the essay where he summarizes his research group’s findings concerning the morality of 
kinship and the new reproduction technologies, Joan Bestard stresses that, since “it installs uncertainty into 
the process of biological construction of a kinship relation,”  “assisted nature can hardly become the 
foundation of the social.  It is manipulated in the laboratory, installed in the body and appropriated as a 
relation of identity.” (2004: 67) 
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Strathern, therefore, proposes that we should go beyond the 
society/individual pair, “because [these terms] invite us to imagine that 
sociality is a question of collectivity (…).” “‘Society’ is seen to be what 
connects individuals to one another, the relationships between them.” (ibid.)  
To the contrary, ever since Malinowski, our ethnographies have been 
showing that this polarisation between unitary entities of different levels of 
abstraction (individual v. group) is not a satisfactory mode of describing 
how sociality operates.  And we should not have been so surprised with our 
ethnographies, since philosophers have long been warning us against this 
view of identity that pits it to alterity in a symmetric relation (cf. Lévinas 
1971).  We should have been warned that, whilst there are indeed many 
contexts where collectivities present themselves as being unitary – and much 
“work” is done among the peoples we describe in our ethnographies in 
order to achieve precisely that effect – a strange evidence has come to 
permeate our research that suggests that “the singular person can be 
imagined as a social microcosm.” (1988: 13) 
Long ago, Lévi-Strauss called our attention to an interesting aspect of 
the ethnographic register.  Whilst, biologically speaking, persons are like 
individual flowers, like specimens of a variety, the fact is that the way 
societies deal with persons is more akin to the way they deal with species 
than with individual specimens.  Social life, he goes on, “effects a strange 
transformation in this system, for it encourages each biological individual to 
develop a personality; and this is a notion no longer recalling specimens 
within a variety but rather types of varieties or of species […]” (1966: 214)  I 
submit that what he is observing in the two chapters of The Savage Mind that 
he dedicates to personal naming is not unlike what I myself have 
encountered in the comparative study of personal naming (cf. Pina-Cabral 
2010b, 2010c, 2012): social practices relating to the naming of persons (and 
domesticated animals) are ambivalently placed before singleness and 
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plurality.  Proper naming works actively at constructing dividuality, 
affirming the intrinsic plurality of what is identified as single. 
Persons present themselves to our ethnographic eye as plurally 
constituted and interpenetrating with each other in deeply complex patterns 
of co-presence and co-substantiality.  Amazingly, the original source of this 
insight is to be found in the notes that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was writing just 
before his death in March 1939.  Having spent a whole lifetime exploring 
why “primitives” did not seem to think like “us,” he found out not only that 
the polarity itself was deeply misguided,8 but also that in fact the argument 
had to be turned around radically.  He had accumulated a gigantic body of 
ethnographic evidence that people were prone to experiencing 
“participation” with other persons, with collectivities, with supernatural 
forces, and even with material aspects of their world (things).  How to make 
sense of this with an Aristotelian-inspired epistemology, he asks himself? 
To put it briefly, Lévy-Bruhl first understood that the modes of 
thinking and being in the world that were evinced by the people 
anthropologists studied were not compatible with the philosophical theories 
concerning mind and reason that dominated his epoch.  As a professor of 
philosophy, therefore, he was led to propose that there were two essential 
modes of thinking: for “primitives” and for “us.”  As he went on exploring 
this insight, however, at a time when the first professional ethnographies 
were emerging in their wonderful quality (he was progressively exposed to 
the work of all of the great ethnographers – French, English and American 
– of the 20’s and 30’s), he came to realize that the problem was perhaps 
broader.  The notion of primitive lost its relevance for him as he explored 
its implications and, in time, he understood that the individualistic notion of 
                                         
8 “I have to show (but it is pointless to spell it out here, even in resumed fashion) that, today 
more than ever, I do not believe that there is a mentalité which characterises ‘primitives’.” (1949:164-5). 
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personhood and the Aristotelic notion of reason that made “participation” 
an absurdity were themselves the very problem that had to be resolved.  I 
presume that his intellectual movement was not unlike that which his 
colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein carried out between his early work and his 
latter annotations at roughly the same time. 
Lévy-Bruhl’s personal notes, posthumously published in 1949, are an 
extraordinary document of deep critical honesty, of how a man can struggle 
with understanding till he is forced to turn around the central 
presuppositions of his world.  Precisely one month before he died, at 82 
years of age, as he wrote his last notes, he finally reached a profound insight 
that remains a major breakthrough in anthropological thinking:  
“What turns participation into something that appears to be irreconcilable with 
the habitual norms of the intellect, is that, without realizing it, we assume that, in 
primitive mentalité, beings are first given and then participate of this or that other 
person, of this or that supernatural force, etc. – without our being able to 
understand how this participation can be established, how a being can be at the 
same time itself and another (…).” (1949: 250) 
Having thus phrased the problem, he found himself able to perform a 
radical inversion of perspective. The solution would be not to presume “that 
beings are given beforehand and then enter into their participations.” (ibid.)  
Rather,  
“A participation is not simply a mysterious and inexplicable fusion between 
beings who lose and keep at the same time their identity.  It enters into the 
constitution of these same beings.  Without participation they would not have 
been a given of their own experience: they would not have existed. (…) 
Participation, therefore, is immanent to the individual as he owes what he is to it.” 
(ibid.) 
 And he concludes: “it is impossible for the individual to separate in 
himself what is properly his and that with which he participates in order to 
exist.” (1949: 251)   
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Now, in the light of today’s theorizing – for people like Sahlins and 
Strathern –, Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of “participation” includes a number of 
factors that we are prone to treat separately and, as Sahlins in fact indirectly 
notes, the concept cannot simply be taken on board (2011b).  However, 
Lévy-Bruhl’s final insight that we were approaching the matter of personal 
identity in a deeply misguided perspective, and that “participating” is the 
condition for being a person and not an adjectival aspect of personhood, 
remains the groundwork upon which today’s notions of mutuality, partibility 
and dividuality must be understood. 
The more direct inspiration for Marilyn Strathern concept of 
“dividuality” is McKim Marriott’s work on India.  There he notes, “What 
goes on between actors are the same connected processes of mixing and 
separation that go on within actors.”9  The sociocentric notion of both group 
and individual that has dominated the social sciences of the twentieth 
century is, thus, undermined.  Instead of this, Marriott proposes a notion of 
dividuality – not only of persons, but also of collectivities: 
“persons – single actors – are not thought in South Asia to be ‘individual’, that is, 
indivisible, bounded units, as they are in much of Western social and psychological 
theory as well as in common sense.  Instead, it appears that persons are generally 
thought by South Asians to be ‘dividual’ or divisible.  To exist, dividual persons 
absorb heterogeneous material influences.  They must also give out from 
themselves particles of their own coded substances – essences, residues, or other 
active influences – that may then reproduce in others something of the nature of 
the persons in whom they have originated.” (1976: 111) 
 If, then, we are to adopt a view of sociality that de-essentializes the 
units of social life, “we shall require a vocabulary that will allow us to talk 
about sociality in the singular as well as in the plural.” (Strathern 1988: 13) 
                                         
9 In Strathern 1988: 349 n7 from Marriott 1976: 109, original emphasis. 
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Individuality does not simply vanish, she argues; rather, it becomes one of 
the conditions (or, better still, perspectives) under which one can approach 
sociality.  In as much as collectivities work at “processes of de-
pluralization”, so persons “contain a generalized sociality within.”  In short, 
“the bringing together of many persons is just like the bringing together of 
one.” (1988: 13) 
 This notion that “persons are intrinsically plural and diverse in origin 
in their acts” (Strathern 1988: 159) should have warned us against 
attempting to reconstruct kinship theory from a sociocentric perspective 
that postulates the unitariness of collectivities (“groups”) and that sees 
kinship as based in an exchange of women between such groups.  Thus, the 
second part of Sahlins’ essay on kinship as mutuality comes as a bit of a 
disappointment (2011b).  He argues there that, “if the alliance is centred in 
the solidarity of marital sexuality, by the same token it is also oppositional, 
insofar as the kin groups united by intermarriage, in giving or taking 
spouses, have differentially affected their membership and reproduction 
potential.” (2011b: 235)  We seem to be back to what he calls “the primary 
exogamous group” (ibid.) – a category that is at the root of the problems 
that confronted structural-functionalist theorising concerning kinship back 
in the 1960’s, as some of us might still remember.  
Abstracted talk of “groupness” uniformizes abusively the evidence 
provided by the ethnographic record of incredible diversity and complexity 
in the arrangements that produce collectivity.  It counters the evidence that 
partibility is not effaceable either for persons or for collectivities.  In the 
same way, talk of alliance as dependent on “marriage” (a Eurocentric notion 
if there is one – Rivière 1971) obscures the famous discovery by Edmund 
Leach that it was unsafe to universalize on the basis of such a category 
(1961).  Thus, talk of “zero-sum games” associated to “groups” that enter 
into “marital” alliance (Sahlins 2011b) turns partibility on its head and makes 
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it something that we have to work at de-constructing in order to make sense 
of sociality, rather than the other way round.  As Sahlins himself very 
advisedly notes, there are serious risks in placing the burden of our 
theorizing on ontology (on “being”), since “philosophical notions of ‘being’ 
have a common tendency to devolve into notions of ‘substance’, even as 
‘substance’ conjures a sense of materiality.” (2011b: 227) 
Children’s “dual life connections” (“double affiliation”) must not be 
seen as an instance of “ambivalence” (Sahlins 2011b: 236) but, to the 
contrary, as the very ground on which sociality is constituted and collectivity 
instituted – that is the upshot of Lévy-Bruhl’s and Strathern’s prophetic 
lessons.  I propose, therefore, that we should recover Strathern’s original use 
of the relation between “partibility” and “dividuality,” where the former 
refers to mediated relations (as through things and persons that are 
conceptualized as parts of other things or persons) and the latter to 
unmediated relations, where “persons are construed as having a direct 
influence in the minds or bodies of those to whom they are thus related.” 
(1988: 178)10  What this means is that partibility results from persons being 
multiple, whilst dividuality qualifies the singularity that characterises partible 
persons.   
It seems, therefore, that we are not in a condition to accept Sahlins’ 
suggestion that kinship should be taken, once again, as a specificiably 
separate realm of sociality.   Kinship, according to him, would be associated 
to the dividuality of persons (their “mutuality of being”), whilst partibility 
would be a generalised condition of sociality.  And here again, I cannot see 
                                         
10 And here we meet an issue that I believe is in sore need of further study: the matter of how 
humans learn what is causality.  Since the days in which Lévy-Bruhl struggled with it in characteristically 
quizzical fashion (1949: 174, 234, 243-4), I believe Rodney Needham was the only one to address it in his 
no less quizzical essay on “Skulls and causality” (1983: 66-92).  The topic, however, is a matter of central 
contemporary philosophical relevance (e.g. Siegel 2010). 
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why Needham’s arguments as to why kinship cannot be logically separated 
from other aspects of social life should not have been revisited (1971) – they 
not only antedate Schneider’s by over a decade but, ultimately, they are far 
more responsible in theoretical terms. 
 
The ethnographic gesture 
If, then, we are to salvage the notion of “mutuality” for anthropological use, 
we have to take into consideration the implications of the dividuality of 
personhood and to deconstruct the way in which individuality is written into 
the common meanings we attribute to the word.  For instance, the Oxford 
Dictionary of English has this to say about the word “mutual” (s.v.): 
“Traditionally it has long been held that the only correct use of mutual is in 
describing a reciprocal relationship: mutual respect, for example, means that 
the parties involved feel respect for each other.  The other use of mutual 
meaning ‘held in common’, as in mutual friend, is regarded as being incorrect.  
This latter use has a long and respectable history, however.  It was first 
recorded in Shakespeare, and has since appeared in the writing of Sir Walter 
Scott, George Eliot, and, most famously, as the title of Dickens’ novel Our 
Mutual Friend.  It is now generally accepted as part of standard English.”  
Indeed, if we were to presume an individualist view of personhood, 
the second meaning of mutual would be incorrect, a logical confusion.  The 
way this second meaning has imposed itself historically, however, in spite of 
repeated calls to abandon it, can be taken as a further instance of the way in 
which dividuality permanently re-emerges.  We must avoid, it would seem, 
any interpretation of dividuality that dissociates it from the more general 
aspects of the human condition that institute partibility.  Mutuality – much 
like Fortes’ earlier amity (1970) – must not be seen as a process that is 
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qualitatively different from those which ground more general human 
interaction.   
Let us, then, return to our initial question concerning what is 
common between these two formulations of mutuality.  I suggest that what 
makes Fabian’s ethnographic mutuality and Sahlins’ kinship mutuality 
instances of the same category is the fact that anthropology is only possible 
because ethnographers are human: that is, they have an entry into all 
possible human worlds.  As A. Duranti has recently argued: “there exists a 
level of intentionality that is pervasive in human action, a level that cannot 
be denied and at the same time is distinct from the particular 
conceptualizations offered by a particular language or discourse.” (2006: 33)  
In short, the common ground between the two meanings of mutuality is 
constituted by the very conditions of possibility of the ethnographic gesture, the 
founding movement of anthropology.   
To carry out fieldwork is to undergo a movement of de-
contextualization and re-contextualization, which is both physical and 
intellectual.  It is this movement that allows the ethnographer to construct a 
particular lived world as a field, that is, a differentiated social world.  In turn, 
this process of differentiation between distinctly identifiable social worlds is 
indispensible for the undertaking of what Pitt-Rivers claimed to be the 
ultimate aim of anthropology: that is, the constant process of de-
ethnocentrification.11  We humans are steeped in history as a source of 
human creativity.  As a human activity, ethnography depends on 
methodological mutuality as much as on the mutuality associated to the 
                                         
11 “Every moral refuge is an evasion of the situation through which alone one can learn to accept the 
native standards in place of one’s own.  Culture shock is, in fact, the process of ‘de-ethnocentrification’ and 
the real problem of fieldwork is not to avoid it but to surmount it, accepting its challenge and putting it to 
moral and intellectual profit, for, through this experience of destruction of one’s self-image, one learns to 
place one’s values in abeyance and to adopt theirs.” (1992: 142) 
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early ontogeny of the person because both are aspects of the human condition.  
The task of anthropology will never be exhausted, because de-
ethnocentrification is never-ending. 
Primatologists have been arguing for some time that humans are 
genetically endowed with a propensity to adopt what they call a “bird’s eye 
view”.  There is a disposition in humans, it would seem, to include “all 
participant roles, including [their] own, in the same representational format.” 
(Tomasello 2008: 266)  This disposition, they argue, is essential for the 
acquisition of language skills as well as all other social skills.  In carrying out 
ethnography, humans depend on this universal human disposition in order 
to make sense of the field, that is, the new world where they are now 
moving, and to make sense of what they encounter there. Thus, the 
constitutive mutuality that disposes humans in early ontogeny to adopt the 
bird’s eye view is also the ground of possibility of ethnographic mutuality.   
Ultimately, therefore, the history of anthropology as a universalist 
discourse of de-ethnocentrification must be seen as an extension of the 
propensity to adopt the bird’s eye view.  Anthropology as a comparative 
exercise cannot be reduced to ethnography but neither can ethnography be 
brushed off simply as a handmaiden of anthropology.  The relation between 
universalist comparativism concerning the human condition and the practice 
of ethnography predates by many centuries the emergence of anthropology 
and ethnography as academic undertakings in the middle of the nineteenth 
century.  We must not forget that the comparativist disposition to which we 
are the heirs today is the product of a long history of travellers and 
missionaries from the far-off days of Herodotus and Ibn Battuta, which 
emerged centrally as a self-conscious humanist undertaking by the beginning 
of the Modern Era.   
In the works of people like Duarte Barbosa, Bartolomé de las Casas, 
or Damião de Góis there was a relation between the gathering of evidence 
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about humanity in general and the direct participation in the life of separate 
humanities that is the historical root both of today’s ethnography and of 
today’s anthropology as academic undertakings. I am inspired in this by 
Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana’s book about Alexandre Valignano, the Jesuit 
missionary in Japan, where he argues that we must see such people as 
engaged in a kind of proto-anthropology (2005). 
Over the past two centuries of explicit academic engagement, 
anthropology and ethnography evolved separately, but never very far from 
each other.   And, whilst they are not mutually exclusive, it is my argument 
that they will never part ways.  When humans engage themselves in an 
attempt to understand their own condition in the most general terms, they 
will ever be driven to the universality that is written into the most particular 
processes of personal engagement – that is, mutuality, the process of co-
construction that results from the disposition to adopt the bird’s eye view.  
Thus, human interaction in the surrounding world is also a process of co-
production of each of the participants as human.  Anthropology, even as a 
scientific enterprise, is grafted onto that. 
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